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A lot of hard work goes in …. It's a massive team effort.  
Rory Best, the captain of the Irish Rugby Union team on winning the 
award of 2018 World Rugby Team of the Year. (Hanratty, 2018). 
 
Introduction 
Attributions are explanations about why particular behavioural or performance 
outcomes occurred, and these explanations enhance our ability to predict and control events 
in the future. Consider for a moment, whether it is even possible to experience sport and not 
consider attributions for behaviours and performances? How would young athletes develop 
and improve if they did not evaluate why a performance went well (to repeat that success) or 
why a performance went poorly (to correct behaviour in the future)? What would sport 
commentators comment on if they could not debate motives for behaviour and reasons for a 
team’s success or demise?  
As pondering such questions makes clear, attributions are front and centre of the 
experience of sport. Most obviously, attribution processes are extremely relevant in sporting 
contexts because these typically involve, and require, clear explanations for success and 
failure. In the above quote from Rory Best, for example, we see that he attributes his team’s 
success to “a lot of hard work” and “a massive team effort.” But equally he might have said, 
“we were very lucky” or “they made a lot of mistakes that we were able to capitalise on”. 
Would this have mattered? And, if so, what would the consequences have been (e.g., for 
team dynamics, motivation, and future performance)?  
These are the sorts of questions that the present chapter seeks to address, in exploring 
the ways in which attributions shape key sporting processes and outcomes. The chapter will 
review predominant theoretical approaches to attributions in sport and exercise psychology 
(Weiner, 1985, 2012, 2018; Rees, Ingledew, & Hardy, 2005). We will look at approaches to 
help athletes and exercisers think more positively (through attributional retraining) and 
consider why there are differences in the way that we explain our own and others’ 
behaviours. The chapter will then move on to discuss how the social identity approach can 
enrich our understanding of attribution processes in sport and exercise settings.  
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Current Approaches to Attribution Research 
Attribution theory 
Bernard Weiner (1985) proposed that human behaviour can be motivated by the way 
individuals explain the causes of events or behavioural outcomes. Take, for example, the case 
of a golfer, Cathy, who fails to make the cut in a major tournament (see Figure 8.1). Weiner’s 
(1985, 2012, 2018) attribution theory suggests that the way she explains this outcome to 
herself will have consequences not only for her well-being but also for her future behaviour 
— such as, her motivation to come back and try to make the cut in the next tournament. In 
particular, the theory predicts that she is going to be more motivated to do this if she 
convinces herself that she adopted the wrong strategy, did not practice enough or that she 
was simply unlucky this time, than if she believes her failure is a sign that she just doesn’t 
have what it takes to succeed. 
 
Figure 8.1 Attributions matter 
Note: Attributions for success and failure have an impact not only on well-being but also on future 
behaviour and performance. For example, if a person attributes their failure at golf to poor 
strategy, to a lack of practice, or to bad luck, they are much less likely to give up than if their 
failure is attributed to a lack of ability. 
Source: Stefan Waldvogel, Pixabay  
 
Weiner argued that attributions for negative, important, or unexpected events occur 
quickly, often outside of awareness, and that these attributions can significantly impact an 
individual’s subsequent cognitions, emotions, and motivated behaviour. In particular, he 
postulated that attributions (i.e., causal explanations of events) can be classified in terms of 
three dimensions or properties: locus of causality, stability, and controllability.  
8: Attribution 4 
Locus of causality refers to whether an event (technically, an explanandum: a thing to 
be explained) is perceived to be caused by a factor internal or external to an individual 
(anchored by an internal or external pole; Weiner, 2014). In our golfing example, attributions 
to bad luck would be external while attributions to lack of ability are internal. These would 
play an important role in determining Cathy’s emotional responses to her failure — not least, 
her self-esteem and sense of worth and her willingness to persevere rather than give up.  
Stability refers to whether an event is perceived as transient or unchanging. This 
causal property is critical in determining expectancies of future success (or failure) and is tied 
to various emotions including (but not limited to) confidence, anxiety, hopelessness, and 
hope. If Cathy believes her failure to make the cut is a one-off event and something that can 
change (e.g., if she changes her strategy), she will feel more hopeful and be less likely to give 
up than if she thinks her performance is unlikely to improve in future.    
Finally, the controllability dimension refers to whether an event is seen to be caused 
by factors that are under a person’s control or beyond their control. This dimension is 
associated with judgments of responsibility so that the more controllable an outcome is, the 
more likely an individual is to take responsibility for it. If Cathy attributes her failure to bad 
luck then this is clearly beyond her control, and she does not need to feel responsible for it; 
however, if she sees it as a reflection of her (lack of) effort or selection of a poor strategy, 
then missing the cut is clearly down to her. In the latter cases, where failure is seen as 
controllable, this is likely to trigger a specific cluster of emotions in the person who 
experiences it — including guilt, anger, and regret. It may also invite criticism from 
onlookers (who might be more sympathetic if the outcome was uncontrollable; Weiner, 
Graham, & Chandler, 1982). 
This analysis alerts us to the fact that there are myriad ways in which any particular 
sporting outcome can be explained. In Cathy’s case, for example, failure to make the cut 
could be explained by her lack of ability (an internal, stable, uncontrollable attribution), by 
adopting the wrong strategy (internal, unstable, controllable), or by her coach’s poor 
instruction (external, stable, uncontrollable). Here, a sense that it results from lack of ability 
is likely to produce lowered expectancy of success and feelings of shame and hopelessness 
since Cathy may view the cause as personal and unchanging. Using a wrong strategy, 
however, is more likely to increase her expectancy for success and produce feelings of guilt 
and a sense of responsibility because the cause is seen as something that can change and is 
within her personal control. By the same token, we can see that Rory Best’s attribution of his 
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team’s success to “a lot of hard work” (an internal and controllable attribution) is likely to 
produce pride and high levels of self-esteem, together with a positive sense of responsibility.  
More generally, as Figure 8.2 conveys, Weiner (1985, 2012, 2018) argues that 
attributions are tied to behaviour change through a temporal sequence in which they first 
affect cognitions, emotions, and then in turn shape behaviour. A key idea here, then, is that 
making the ‘right’ attribution is an important way to produce desired forms of behaviour 
down the track. In Cathy’s case, for example, if she is going to go on to greater things in golf, 
it will be important for her to see her failure as something more than simply a reflection of 
her lack of ability.   
      
 
Figure 8.2 Attribution theory 
Note: Weiner’s (1985, 2012, 2018) attribution theory specifies a temporal sequence in which 
attributions — which involve seeing an event as having an internal or external locus of control, as 
being stable or unstable, and as being controllable or uncontrollable — first influence cognitions, 
emotions, and then in turn shape behaviour. 
 
When it comes to efforts to promote positive outcomes in sport, the dominant line of 
theorising has placed particular emphasis on the importance of the controllability dimension 
(e.g., Biddle, 1993; Hardy, Jones, & Gould, 1996). In particular, Tim Rees and colleagues 
(2005) proposed that research in sport and exercise psychology should focus on the main 
effects of controllability as well as on the way that controllability interacts with 
generalisability. Generalisability relates to stability (as defined in Weiner’s theory) and also 
globality and universality. Globality concerns the degree to which the cause of an event is 
seen as likely to affect a wide (vs. a narrow) range of situations; universality concerns the 
degree to which the cause of an event is seen to be common to all people (vs. unique to an 
individual; Rees et al., 2005).  
The first author and his colleagues have examined the interactive effects of 
controllability and generalisability and have provided empirical evidence of the conditions 
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under which controllability is pertinent to future outcomes (e.g., Coffee, Greenlees, & Allen, 
2015; Coffee & Rees, 2008a, 2008b, 2009). For example, in the case of our golfer Cathy, if 
her failure is seen as being due to something that is likely to affect a wide range of situations 
then it is important that she has control over these factors and can influence them (Coffee et 
al., 2015; Coffee & Rees, 2008b). Such attributions might include ineffective practice or 
using the wrong strategy. Indeed, as these are attributions that will affect a number of new 
future situations for Cathy, it is crucial that she has control over them. For this is likely to 
enhance her mental state following failure, by boosting expectations for success and positive 
emotions, and this should result in improved performance in the future.  
But what if Cathy attributes her failure to a different global attribution such as, for 
example, her lack of ability? In this case, Cathy’s attribution will again influence a number of 
new future situations but ones that she has little to no control over. This is likely to impair 
her mental state following failure, fuelling negative emotions and reducing expectations for 
success, and this will result in poorer performance in the future. Together, then, the 
interactive effects of controllability and generalisability suggest that whilst a sense of control 
over the causes of failure (and success) is always important, its impact on cognitions, 
emotions, and behaviour is dependent on the generalisability of causes (e.g., whether the 
cause affects a wide vs. narrow range of situations). 
 
Attributional retraining 
Building on the foregoing ideas, attributional retraining is a motivation intervention 
designed to encourage individuals to develop adaptive (e.g., controllable) rather than 
maladaptive (e.g., uncontrollable) explanations for poor performance (Perry, Chipperfield, 
Hladkyj, Pekrun, & Hamm, 2014). For example, the retraining may focus on helping an 
athlete understand the ways in which outcomes are controllable and unstable (e.g., a 
consequence of ‘strategy’; adaptive) rather than uncontrollable and stable (e.g., due to ‘low 
ability’; maladaptive). Speaking to the efficacy of this approach, a range of studies point to 
the capacity for attributional retraining to promote positive cognitive, emotional, and 
motivational outcomes as well as to stimulate improved performance and increased 
persistence across a range of sporting and educational contexts (Le Foll, Rascle, & Higgins, 
2008; Perry et al., 2014; Rascle, Le Foll, Charrier, Higgins, Rees, & Coffee, 2015; Rees, 
Salvatore, Coffee, Haslam, Sargent & Dobson, 2013).  
In sport, recent attributional retraining studies have looked at attributions used for 
individuals’ golf-putting and dart-throwing performance. For example, in a study by Olivier 
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Rascle and colleagues (2015), students were randomly assigned to an adaptive (functional) 
attributional feedback group, a maladaptive (dysfunctional) attributional feedback group, and 
a no feedback group. Those in the adaptive attributional condition were told that the causes 
of their performance on the task (e.g., golf-putting) reflected mostly personally controllable 
and unstable factors (e.g., their effort or strategy). They were also reminded that they could 
take personal control over the effort they put into the task and that the intensity of effort 
might change over time. Students in the maladaptive attributional feedback condition were 
told that the causes of their performance on the task (golf-putting) reflected personally 
uncontrollable and stable factors (e.g., task difficulty). They were told these factors were not 
something they could control and that they would not change over time. Finally, students in 
the control condition were given general information about the task (e.g., that different skills 
are required to be a good golf player, the distance of the putt).  
Going back to our original example, let’s suppose Cathy was in the adaptive 
attributional feedback group, and her peer, Jack, was in the maladaptive feedback group. The 
findings of Rascle and colleagues’ study suggest that after failing on the golf-putting task 
Cathy, who received the adaptive attributional feedback, would be more likely (a) to attribute 
her performance to controllable causes, (b) to believe she would be more successful in the 
future, and (c) to persist in practicing her putting. Being in the maladaptive feedback 
condition, Jack on the other hand would be more likely (a) to explain failure in terms of 
uncontrollable and stable causes, (b) to have lower expectations for future success, and (c) to 
stop practicing his putting. In this way we see that how Cathy and Jack explain their 
performance failure is likely to have a big impact both on their expectations of future success 
and on what they actually do to improve their skills (i.e., through practice) in ways that make 
success more likely. Aside from research on golf-putting and dart-throwing, research in sport 
has consistently shown attributional retraining techniques to have similar effects across other 
domains including college tennis and basketball at both beginner and recreational levels 
(Orbach, Singer, & Murphey, 1997; Orbach, Singer, & Price, 1999), and effects on important 
outcomes like objective performance (Rees et al., 2013).  
While there is strong evidence for the efficacy of attributional retraining in sport, 
attribution-based treatment procedures vary considerably. Moreover, they are not as 
systematic as those that have been implemented in education contexts (e.g., Perry & Hamm, 
2017). Education-based attributional retraining treatment protocols typically comprise three 
phases. Following the delivery of a questionnaire (to collect demographic and baseline data), 
Phase 1 (causal search activation) prompts participants to engage in attributional thinking by 
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considering the causes of failure on some achievement task (e.g., they are asked to think 
about the last time they did poorly on a course test and the reasons for it). Phase 2 
(attributional induction) then asks participants to watch a video presentation that encourages 
them to make internal, controllable attributions and discourages internal, uncontrollable 
attributions for failure. Often the retraining focuses on only two attributional dimensions 
(internal and controllable attributions) in order to simplify the content delivery and help 
students retain the information. Attributional retraining videos have varied in format 
delivery, and include such things as a conversation between an undergraduate and graduate 
student, or a PowerPoint presentation in which a narrator explains the benefits of using 
internal and controllable attributions for poor academic performance (e.g., improved 
motivation and achievement). Finally, Phase 3 (consolidation) involves asking participants to 
summarise the treatment content and to reflect on its relevance to their own lives (see 
Haynes, Perry, Stupnisky, & Daniels, 2009). Depending on the study, participants in no-
attributional retraining (control group) conditions either do not receive a treatment or are 
asked to complete a filler task in which they view a presentation of similar length on 
unrelated course content.  
Across a range of educational studies, protocols of this form have been observed to 
improve students’ academic performance (e.g., Parker, Perry, Hamm, Chipperfield, & 
Hladkyj, 2016; Parker, Perry, Hamm, Chipperfield, Hladkyj, & Leboe-McGowan, 2018).  
Indeed, integrating insights from sport and education contexts, researchers have used 
attributional retraining as part of efforts to improve the academic adjustment of competitive 
athletes at university. For example, research by the second author and her colleagues (Parker 
et al., 2016; Parker et al., 2018) found that encouraging competitive student athletes to make 
adaptive attributions when explaining negative events (e.g., poor performance on a course 
test) increased their subsequent performance and persistence on academic tasks. These 
attributional retraining treatments proved to be particularly useful for student-athletes who 
had perceived themselves to have limited control over their academic course. In an online 
learning environment, such treatments have also been found to benefit student athletes who 
are faced with a range of stressors at university. Evidence suggests they do this by enhancing 
cognitions (e.g., increasing perceived control) which, in line with Weiner’s temporal model 
(see Figure 8.2), then go on to shape emotions and, through this, final grades (Parker et al., 
2018). 
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Attribution biases  
Within the attribution literature one prominent research focus since the early 1970s 
has been on the biases that lead perceivers to favour certain forms of explanation over others. 
In this tradition, one of the patterns that has received most attention is the actor-observer bias 
(Jones & Nisbett, 1972). This relates to the tendency for actors to attribute outcomes —
 particular negative ones — more to external (situational) causes than do observers. For 
example, a male footballer who misses a penalty may blame this on the booing of the crowd 
or the poor quality of the penalty spot, whereas onlookers might explain it in terms of his 
inherently poor penalty-taking skills. Likewise, if a basketball team loses an important game, 
team members might attribute their loss to the poor decisions of the referee, the luck of their 
opponent, or an injury of their own players, while neutral bystanders might simply observe 
that the team wasn’t as good as its opponent. 
One potential explanation for this asymmetric pattern of attribution is that actors and 
observers have access to very different contextual data (Jones & Nisbett, 1972). In line with 
this point it is clear that the viewpoint or perspective of actors during an action or 
performance is quite different to that of onlookers. For example, a penalty-taker may see the 
poor pitch surface, and the basketball team may see that a referee has missed a foul in a way 
that onlookers cannot. More generally, because actors are looking outward, the situation and 
environment are more likely to be salient in ways that lead them to make external, situational 
explanations for behaviour. However, for observers, the actor is more likely to be the focus 
of attention and hence to be salient in ways that lead them to make more internal, 
dispositional explanations for behaviour. Again, if we take our golfer Cathy as an example of 
an actor, she may attribute her missing of a putt to the strong wind blowing in her face. In 
contrast, observers may see the missed putt simply as evidence of her inability to read the 
green. Indeed, this failure of observers to take account of actors’ perspective when explaining 




8: Attribution 10 
 
Figure 8.3  The actor-observer effect and the fundamental attribution error 
Note: The fundamental attribution error relates to the tendency for observers to explain other people’s 
behavior with reference to those people’s personal characteristics (e.g., lack of skill), rather than 
situational factors (e.g., challenging circumstances). This can be seen to be a consequence of an 
actor-observer bias which leads actors to be more sensitive than observers to the situational 
determinants of behaviour.    
 
Researchers have generally seen the actor-observer asymmetry to be both robust 
(Jones, 1976) and pervasive (Aronsen, 2002; Baron, Byrne, & Branscombe, 2006). 
Nevertheless, there is evidence that the effect is more nuanced than often supposed, for at 
least three reasons. First, it plays out differently in the context of intentional (i.e., a specific, 
deliberate reason for action by an actor, brought about by skill towards some form of 
outcome) and unintentional behaviours (i.e., an undeliberate action, brought about by luck 
that has led to some form of outcome), such that it applies only to unintentional behaviours 
(Malle,1999). Second, it operates differently in naturalistic settings (i.e., in 
competition/training environments, as opposed to the experimental settings where it has 
generally been studied; Lewis, 1995). And, third, it is more pronounced for negative events 
than for positive ones (Malle, Knobe, & Nelson, 2007). Indeed, while athletes may often be 
reluctant to take personal blame for their failures, they are typically much more willing to 
take personal credit for their success. 
Taking stock of these issues, over the last two decades, Bertram Malle and his 
colleagues (2007) have developed an alternative approach—the folk conceptual theory of 
behaviour explanations. To understand this, imagine the scenario in which a football player, 
Lucy, attempts to make a difficult pass up the pitch to a teammate, but is unsuccessful. 
Within traditional actor-observer bias we might expect Lucy (the player; the actor) to see the 
failure of the pass to be a consequence of an opposition player getting the better of their 
teammate (a situational attribution), whereas her coach (Gareth, the observer) may explain 
the failure as a reflection of Lucy’s lack of ability (a dispositional attribution). However, 
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Malle and colleagues argue that explanations of events go further than just situational-
dispositional explanations. More specifically, they note that they entail not only internal or 
external attributions but also what they refer to as modes of cause and reason explanations.  
Spelling this point out, Malle and colleagues’ (2007) theory posits three actor-
observer hypotheses. The first pertains to reason asymmetry, and implies that actors use more 
reasons and fewer causal history explanations than observers. In our football scenario, for 
example, Lucy (the player) is more able to recall the particular reasons for her actions (e.g., 
why she attempted a difficult pass in light of all the other options open to her), but for Gareth 
(the coach) these reasons are less observable. Gareth therefore has to rely more on stored 
knowledge and inferences (causal history) about Lucy to explain why she attempted the pass 
and why she was unsuccessful. As we will discuss further below, this asymmetry is also 
likely to be affected by, and affect, the relationship between the coach and the athlete — in 
particular, the extent of their shared social identity (e.g., as members of the same team). 
The second hypothesis pertains to belief asymmetry. This predicts that actors use 
relatively more belief reasons and fewer desire reasons than observers. For example, Lucy’s 
(the player) decision to attempt the difficult pass is influenced by her knowledge, assessment, 
and the potential outcome of the action at that moment in time. Accordingly, Lucy is more 
likely to explain her actions with reference to her belief that she saw her teammate and her 
belief that she could make the pass and that the pass would lead to a positive outcome for her 
team. However, for Gareth (the coach), the beliefs of Lucy are difficult to infer, and this may 
lead him to explain the action of Lucy with reference more to desire-based reasons, such as 
“Lucy panicked and wanted to get rid of the ball as quickly as possible to relieve the pressure 
she was under” (i.e., her desire was to protect herself). This type of explanation again has 
links to the fundamental attribution error highlighted in Figure 8.3. 
The final hypothesis pertains to marker asymmetry. This asserts that actors are more 
likely than observers to leave their belief reasons unmarked (i.e., to take them as given; 
Malle, 1999, 2004; Malle et al., 2007). In our example, this means that Lucy (the player) is 
likely to focus directly on the content of her beliefs (e.g., my teammate was in a good 
position) rather than to say that she ‘believed’ that her teammate was in a good position. In 
contrast, Gareth (the coach) is more likely to make reference to Lucy’s beliefs; for example, 
remarking that “she ‘believed’ that he could get out of trouble by kicking the ball up the 
pitch”. In this way, observers (e.g., a coach) mark beliefs in order to make sense of aspects of 
actors’ behaviour that they could not otherwise account for.  
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These three hypotheses anticipate a number of psychological processes which shape 
the explanations given by both actors and observers. These include how well an observer 
knows and understands not only the social context of performance but also the actor (or 
actors) and how motivated they are to influence the attribution in question. In this context, 
Malle and colleagues (2007) observed that close (intimate) observers generally portrayed an 
actor in a more positive light than distant (stranger) observers. Again, this attunes us to 
insights from the social identity approach in so far as the ‘closeness’ of observers can be 
understood to be a proxy for shared social identity — such that close observers see actors as 
ingroup members and distant observers see actors as outgroup members. Indeed, in what 
follows, we will expand on this observation to note that social identity processes are a latent 
feature of most attributional processes in sport (Coffee, 2017).    
 
A Social Identity Approach to Attribution Processes 
 Chapter 2 drew attention to the five spheres of sports-related activity to which social 
identity theorizing has profound relevance (the 5Ps: Reicher, 2017): participation (what sport 
and exercise activities people engage in), performance (how well people do those activities), 
psychological and physical health (how well people feel because of doing those activities), 
partisanship (how people behave as supporters of sport activity) and politics (how people 
acquire and wield power in and through sporting activity). Attribution processes are integral 
to all five of these spheres of sports-related activity. Furthermore, we argue below that social 
identity and self-categorisation processes are themselves foundational to these attributions. 
Indeed, the social identity approach suggests that the groups to which people belong can be, 
and often are, incorporated into their sense of self and, through this, are powerful 
determinants of all cognitions — including attributions (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 
1994). In the remainder of this chapter, then, we look to explore how social identity-informed 
attributions determine participation, performance, psychological and physical health, 
partisanship, and politics.  
Consider for a moment the sports and activities you engage in (or do not engage in). 
What are the reasons (attributions) for your participation and how do they affect your 
emotions and subsequent engagement? And how does your membership of particular social 
groups affect your reasons for participation? For example, you might say, “I play football 
because we — my football team — are really good at it so I’m going to keep playing”. Or 
you might say, “I go to exercise classes because we — my CrossFit group — have a lot of 
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fun so I’m going to keep going.” In both these examples, it is clear that attributions of ability 
and fun are intrinsically informed by group memberships in ways that affect your current and 
future participation in these activities (see also Stevens et al., chapter 12 below; Beauchamp 
& O’Rourke, Chapter 13 below).  
As a second example, consider how partisanship — associated with distinct social 
identities — affects our explanations of the behaviour of those we observe. Here it is clear, 
for example, that a Liverpool fan and an Everton fan can watch exactly the same game of 
football between their two clubs but form very different explanations for the performances 
they observe (Hastorf & Cantril, 1954). The Liverpool fan might describe the excellent goal 
that Liverpool scored as a great piece of ingenuity and creativity by a Liverpool striker. An 
Everton fan, however, might describe exactly the same event as a lucky goal that Liverpool 
scored due to the deflection of the ball and the obstruction of the goalkeeper’s view. Here, 
then, the social identity-informed partisanship of the fans results in very different 
explanations for the same observed event. 
 Yet despite the obvious relevance of social identity processes to attribution processes, 
at present, they are largely neglected within the attribution literature (not only in sport but 
also in social psychology more generally; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). In large part, this 
is because these theories position athletes and observers as individuals rather than as 
members of groups. In what follows, we attempt to correct this oversight by highlighting 
three key points which emerge from a social identity approach to attributions in sport. 
 
Key Point 1: Attributions are shaped by social identities and are made to groups not 
just individuals  
As we have seen, attribution research in sport typically focuses on athletes’ 
explanations of why they have succeeded or failed. As we have also seen, much of this work 
has a focus on the individual as an individual, so that, for example, self-referent attributions 
centre on the causes for an athlete’s personal performance (e.g., “what I did that made me 
fail”). In other words, the ‘self’ here is taken to be personal rather than collective. It is clear, 
though, that, like performance itself, this attribution process often has a very significant 
social dimension. This means that attributions are typically shaped by a range of social 
factors, not least the people around us. For example, after missing the cut, Cathy’s coach 
might tell her she putted poorly, while her partner might inform her that she wasn’t focused 
enough. This leads to the more general observation that attributions are never made in a 
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vacuum. Instead, they are made in the context of others’ attributions, and those attributions 
have an important bearing on our own.  
Consistent with this point, a range of attribution experiments have pointed to the 
profound influence that others can have on performance. In particular, in a range of contexts 
researchers have effectively manipulated how individuals explain their performance by 
providing feedback of a specified form (e.g., that their failure was due to controllable and 
unstable factors or else to uncontrollable and stable factors; e.g., Rascle, Le Foll, & Higgins, 
2008). Although this feature of experiments is typically taken for granted (and hence is not 
part of the researchers theorising) it nevertheless shows how athletes’ attributions can be 
shaped by others in ways that have significant consequences for their performance.  
Of course, though, it also matters who provides the performance feedback. For 
example, when walking off the green after missing the cut in her golf tournament, Cathy 
might take no notice if a rival tells her she has lost her touch and that it is time for her to 
retire. However, if that feedback came from her caddy, she would likely take notice. Along 
these lines, researchers have observed that whether or not one shares social identity with 
those who provide performance feedback has an important bearing on athletes’ perceptions 
of the feedback and, in turn, on their performance (Rascle, Charrier, Higgins, Rees, Coffee, 
Le Foll, & Cabagno, 2019; Rees et al., 2013). This means that in applied settings, athletes 
will often be most influenced by those ‘insiders’ who are close to them with whom they share 
social identity. So while an athlete’s own attributions are likely to be sensitive to the 
attributions made by ‘insiders’ such as teammates, coaches, family, and friends (Rees & 
Hardy, 2000), the attributions of ‘outsiders’ (e.g., journalists, rivals) will often be ignored. 
 Up to this point, our discussion of attributions has focused very much on the personal 
self (i.e., individuals’ explanations for their own individual performance). Clearly, though, 
athletes also make attributions that are relevant to the collective self (e.g., team members’ 
explanations for their team’s performance; Allen, Coffee, & Greenlees, 2012). Indeed, team-
referent attributions are commonplace in sport (Gill, Ruder, & Gross, 1982; see appendix for 
a suitable scale from Coffee et al., 2015). It is common, for example, to hear people say 
things such as “Arsenal are lucky”, “Germans are good at penalties”, “referees always favour 
Manchester United”. Indeed, the quote at the start of this chapter is a good example of one 
such team-referent attribution — where Rory Best presents the team’s success as resulting 
from ‘a lot of hard work’ and ‘a massive team effort’.  
In this regard, a key prediction of social identity theorising is that in an array of social 
contexts — not least sporting ones — individuals internalise group memberships as part of 
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themselves. In particular, individuals who identify highly with a group (high-identifiers) are 
inclined to perceive events from the group perspective (Cruwys, South, Greenaway, & 
Haslam, 2015), and hence are more likely to make team-referent attributions. Amongst other 
things, this means that after a performance, these high identifiers are more likely than low 
identifiers (or people who identify with other groups) to use the collective pronouns ‘we’ and 
‘us’ (vs. ‘I’ and ‘me’) when describing, and making attributions about, their performance.  
As one illustration of these points, it is notable that when discussing his game with 
journalists the professional golfer Jordan Spieth invariably uses the collective pronoun “we”, 
when referring to himself and other members of his team (e.g., his caddie, coach, and trainer; 
Wacker, 2016; see Figure 8.4). Including his team as part of his self-definition in this way 
has two distinct consequences. First, it clearly communicates his sense of shared social 
identity. Second, it means that he is more likely to make team-referent attributions to explain 
his performance — whether good or bad (e.g., attributing a win to our effort, rather than just 
my effort).  
 
 
Figure 8.4  Team-referent attributions 
Note: When an athlete — such as the professional golfer Jordan Spieth, pictured here — uses the 
collective pronouns ‘we’ and ‘us’ to describe themselves and their teammates this communicates 
a sense that they perceive themselves to share social identity with those other team members and 
is likely to be associated with a greater willingness to make team-referent attributions. These 
things in turn are likely to have important implications for well-being and performance.  
Source: Wikimedia Commons.  
 
Importantly, researchers have noted that the inclination to make team-based 
attributions tends to have implications for well-being and performance (Allen, Jones, & 
Sheffield, 2009; Coffee et al., 2015). Identification with a team also increases the likelihood 
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that adaptive team-referent attributions will have a positive impact on future outcomes 
(Murray, Coffee, Arthur, & Eklund, in press). For example, if a cricketer, Trevor identifies 
highly with his cricket team he is more likely to see his team’s loss as a collective failure 
(rather than just as his own individual failure) and if his team makes an adaptive team-
referent attribution for its loss (e.g., believing it is the result of a poor strategy that they can 
improve on in future) then he is likely to be more confident in his team’s ability to succeed in 
future. In ways discussed by Cruwys and colleagues in Chapter 11 below, these team-based 
attributions are also likely to enhance his well-being by giving him a greater sense of control, 
support and agency, as well as a greater sense of collective self-efficacy (Haslam, Jetten, 
Cruwys, Dingle, & Haslam, 2018).  
Social identity is also important when examining the effects of intra-team agreement 
in team-referent attributions. This is something that research by the third author and his 
colleagues has shown to be associated with positive performance outcomes (Murray, Coffee, 
Eklund, & Arthur, 2019). Specifically, when team members agreed with fellow team 
members about the cause of team failure, then this led to a significant improvement in their 
subsequent performance. This suggests that team performance is enhanced to the extent that 
team members are on the same attributional page, so to speak. Indeed, even though high 
levels of agreement and lack of divergent thinking (i.e., disagreement) can be implicated in 
negative outcomes such as groupthink (Cosier & Schwenk, 1990; Turner, Pratkanis, 
Probasco, & Leve, 2006), there is generally value in having — and seeking to develop — a 
shared understanding both of ‘why we failed’ or ‘why we succeeded’ (Haslam, 2001).   
Indeed, even if team members have different ideas about the cause of a team 
performance, it seems reasonable to suppose that sharing these ideas would lead to a more 
comprehensive understanding of the causes behind a team performance. At the same time, 
though, an environment in which team members make different team-referent attributions 
also has the potential to create conflict within the group (Mitchell, 2016; Paradis, Carron, & 
Martin, 2014). For this reason, Tom Postmes and colleagues recommend that teams build 
norms attached to their social identities that encourage sharing of information (i.e., 
disagreement among team members; Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). For if teammates 
feel they can openly discuss their attributions for team failure (and success) without fear of 
conflict, a more thorough causal search can take place, which will increase the likelihood of 
team performance improving in future. One reason for this is that the sharing of such 
information can itself help to build a sense of shared identity in ways that have positive 
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implications for performance and well-being (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; e.g., as 
discussed in Chapter 5 above and Chapter 11 below).   
 
Key Point 2: Social identity has an important role to play in attributional retraining  
As we have seen, current approaches to attributional retraining have focused on 
individual-level factors (e.g., “how can ‘I’ control the cause of this outcome?”). However, the 
social identity approach offers a new perspective on the process of encouraging adaptive 
thinking (i.e., adaptive attributions) through attributional retraining. In particular, it raises the 
question of whether treatment protocols might be enhanced by providing individuals with a 
cognitive platform for accessing group-based resources (e.g., “How can ‘we’ control the 
cause of this outcome?”).  
Two studies that speak to the potential of this line of thinking were conducted by 
Tegan Cruwys and colleagues (2015) and examined how social identity might reduce levels 
of depression by fostering positive attributions. This possibility relates to previous research 
which shows that depressed people often fail to display the self-serving attributional bias in 
which credit is taken for personal success and blame is denied for personal failure (e.g., 
Peterson & Seligman, 1984). That is, a depressed person is more likely to attribute negative 
events to causes like “I’m just not good enough in everything I do” — something that is 
about themselves (internal), something that is not going to change (stable), something that 
influences many areas of their life (global), and something that is unique to them (personal). 
In their studies, Cruwys and colleagues found that social identity was an important moderator 
of this trend. More specifically, they found that individuals with stronger social identities — 
that is, those who had a stronger sense of connection to meaningful groups in their lives 
(something that the researchers measured in one study and manipulated in another) — were 
less likely to perceive negative outcomes (e.g., when bad things happen) as internal, stable, 
and global, and, as a result of this, they reported lower levels of depression. Of interest to our 
suggestion above that collective attributions can provide a cognitive platform for accessing 
group-based resources, one of the mechanisms that Cruwys and colleagues identified as 
explaining their findings was a shift in attentional focus among participants with a stronger 
sense of social identity away from personally self-referent explanations for their behaviour 
towards explanations that were group-referent. In other words, social identity helped people 
to see failure as something which wasn’t just down to themselves, and as a result helped 
them stave off depression.   
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To get a better understanding of this process, we can imagine a situation in which our 
golfer Cathy is part of a team that did not perform well in their most recent tournament. 
Social identity research suggests that if Cathy is able to shift away from thinking about this 
failure in personal terms (e.g., “how can ‘I’ control the cause of the negative outcome?”) 
towards thinking collectively in terms of her team (e.g., “how can ‘we’ control the cause of 
the negative outcome?”), then this is likely to provide her with access to group-based 
resources that will facilitate opportunities for adaptive thinking.  
The same approach can also be applied to encourage adaptive thinking around 
personal performance. For example, Cathy might feel that she let the team down due to her 
poor ability (a maladaptive attribution) and that it was this that led the team to defeat. But 
encouraging her to draw upon her social identity as a golfer and consider how other golfers 
might explain a poor performance could help to provide her with access to group-sourced, 
alternative explanations that are more adaptive. For example, if she has a salient, positive 
social identity as a golfer, Cathy might be more likely to ask herself, “How do other golfers 
explain a poor performance?” This process of critical distancing by looking at the world from 
the perspective of other ingroup members might also lead Cathy to consider alternative 
attributions for her poor performance, such as ‘poor strategy’, or ‘inefficient practice’ (all 
adaptive attributions). In sum, then, there are strong grounds for thinking that helping athletes 
reflect on events from the perspective of shared social identity (e.g., ‘us swimmers’, ‘us 
athletes’, ‘us business executives’, ‘us students’) can provide a cognitive platform for them to 
access more adaptive attributions for negative events.  
It is also possible to apply these ideas directly to attributional retraining interventions 
in ways that might improve their effectiveness. Above we noted that such interventions 
typically help participants who tend to make maladaptive attributions to video feedback in 
which a peer or expert proposes alternative more adaptive attributions for an event (e.g., 
seeing poor strategy as the cause of a bad performance outcome; see Perry et al., 2014; Perry 
& Hamm, 2017). However, the social identity principles discussed above suggest that there 
are a number of ways that this intervention can be more forensically targeted. First, they 
suggest that such an intervention is likely to be more effective if participants see themselves 
as sharing a social identity with the person in the video (i.e., if the peer or expert is seen as an 
ingroup member; see Haslam, Jetten, O’Brien, & Jacobs, 2004). Second, they suggest that 
there is value in encouraging participants to make, where possible, team-referent (not just 
personal) attributions as these will give them more access to group-based resources for 
explaining and addressing negative outcomes. And third, they suggest that attributional 
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retraining can be more effective if participants are encouraged to understand events from the 
perspective of other ingroup members as this will help to facilitate critical distancing that 
increases their access to alternative, group-sourced adaptive explanations for events. 
 
Key Point 3: Social identity shapes observer attributions  
According to the social identity approach, to the extent that they define themselves in 
terms of shared social identity, group members are motivated to think and behave in ways 
that align them with fellow ingroup members while also differentiating themselves from 
outgroup members. This means that when they have a high degree of shared social identity, 
individuals come to see themselves and other ingroup members as functionally 
interchangeable (Turner, 1982). This in turns turn affects how they evaluate the actions and 
behaviour of members both of their ingroup and of other outgroups. In line with this point, a 
study by Michael Hogg and Elizabeth Hardie (1991) found that highly identified members of 
an Australian Rules football team in Melbourne had significantly more positive evaluations 
of prototypical group members (i.e., those who were highly representative of the group) than 
they did of non-prototypical group members (Hogg & Hardie, 1991). Moreover, this 
prototypicality was in turn a basis for their liking of different players — so that players liked 
other players more, the more they embodied the group’s identity.  
This analysis is also relevant to our understanding of observer attributions and the 
work of the fourth author (Kawycz, Coffee, & Eklund, 2017), where explanations of the 
behaviour and performance of an actor (e.g., an athlete) are also likely to be structured by 
perceptions of shared (and non-shared) social identity. In particular, within a sporting 
context, people are likely to offer positive explanations for the behaviour of athletes the more 
they see themselves as sharing social identity. This can anecdotally be seen in post-match 
interviews with players and coaches. For example, when questioned about a poor 
performance from their team, players and managers typically offer explanations that support 
their team or teammates, while at the same time attributing defeat to more situational and 
external factors (e.g., bad referee decisions or the opposition’s good fortune).  
Research on fan culture provides abundant evidence of ingroup favouring patterns in 
explanations of sport-related events or behaviour. As noted earlier, and in line with the fourth 
author’s work (Kawycz & Coffee, 2019), researchers have observed that highly identified 
fans (observers) are more likely to attribute the success of ‘their’ athletes/teams (ingroup 
actors) to internal factors, and the failure of ‘their’ athletes/teams to external factors (Fink, 
Parker, Brett, & Higgins, 2009; Madrigal & Chen, 2008). In this sense, a positive ‘self-
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serving’ bias is extended to members of the ingroup in the form of a ‘team’ or ‘group-
serving’ bias. In self-categorisation terms, then, when social identity is salient, the ‘team’ 
becomes representative of their ‘self’. Typically, then, fans are keen to ensure credit is given 
to their team for its successes, while also protecting it from blame in the event of failure. 
Furthermore, as social identity theory suggests, fans will generally strive to compare their 
team favourably to other teams, such that they root against rival teams and provide negative 
explanations for their behaviour. As noted in Chapter 2 above, this is particularly true for 
highly identified fans who need to recover threatened self-esteem in the face of group failure. 
These fans are particularly motivated to see ‘us’ as positively distinct from ‘them’ — and this 
applies not just to the way they describe outgroup (and ingroup) behaviour but also to the 
way they explain it.  
This effect has also been observed when the behaviour of ingroup athletes (actors) is 
highly problematic or even criminal (Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998). As an example of this, 
consider the following analysis provided by a fan of Lance Armstrong after the cyclist had 
been found to have taken performance-enhancing drugs: 
Lance was operating at a very high level alongside competitors who were making the 
same sacrifices that he was. Take a look at any competitive sport or high-pressure career 
and there are conflicts of interest. It was against the rules to take performance-enhancing 
drugs; the fact large numbers of the pro peloton were using at the same time does not 
excuse Lance's behaviour, but in my eyes it does vindicate him slightly. 
(Warnakulasuriya, 2017) 
 
Here the fan — a fellow American — clearly shows group-serving bias in seeking to explain 
Armstrong’s actions (see Figure 8.5). More specifically, they seek to diminish the 
seriousness of the behaviour presenting it as having resulted from situational not 
dispositional factors. The suggestion that large numbers of other cyclists were taking 
performance-enhancing drugs also seeks to minimize the need to provide an explanation for 
the behaviour. This, then, alerts us to a collective dimension to Malle and colleagues (2007) 
notions of asymmetry that we discussed above: for when observers identify highly with 
actors they too will be motivated to see the world from their perspective and display the same 
reason, belief, and marker asymmetries. In this case, then, the fan’s suggestion that there is 
‘nothing to explain here’, mirrors the reason asymmetry that Armstrong himself displayed 
when pointing to a host of factors that contributed to his behaviour (notably the culture in 
cycling and the pressure to win; Rodgers, 2013).    
 




Figure 8.5  Group-serving bias amongst fans 
Note: When an athlete — such as Lance Armstrong, pictured here — has been found guilty of illegal 
or illegitimate sporting behaviour, their supporters will often display group-serving bias in their 
explanations of the infringement. For example, they may downplay the significance of the 
behaviour (i.e., attributing it to non-dispositional factors) and/or suggest that it was more a 
consequence of the environment (i.e., attributing it to situational factors). They will also often 
display the same reason, belief, and marker asymmetries as the athlete themselves.  
Source: Wikipedia  
 
Drawing on these examples, future research in this area might do well to consider the 
way in which attributions are shaped by — and also themselves shape — the coach-athlete 
relationship. As we noted above, a coach (observer) is typically required to look at why an 
athlete was successful or unsuccessful and provide explanations for their performance. These 
explanations have an impact on cognitions towards the athlete such as attitudes (hard-
working, lazy), emotions towards the athlete (happy, angry), and behaviours (kind and 
engaging, abrupt and disengaging). Furthermore, the explanations that the coach provides can 
impact both training plans and strategic training decisions in ways that can ultimately help to 
improve (or not) the athlete’s performance. Importantly, though, as Peters notes in Chapter 4 
above, effective communication between the coach and the athlete will be determined by 
levels of shared social identity and so too will their attributions. Indeed, under conditions 
where athlete and coach share the same social identity, their perspective on social reality — 
and hence their attributions — will become interchangeable, so that, in effect, the coach is no 
longer an observer but instead becomes a co-actor.  
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In line with ideas presented earlier in this chapter, in this way shared social identity 
can also help to facilitate effective communication of divergent explanations for behaviour 
between the coach and the athlete. In particular, this means that criticism or challenge to the 
athlete’s performance is more likely to be seen as constructive and therefore promote growth 
rather than conflict (Hornsey, Oppes, & Svensson, 2002). For example, if a coach and athlete 
perceive themselves to share (rather than not share) social identity, then when the coach tells 
the player that they are not training hard enough and that their technique needs improving, 
this message is more likely to be received and to lead to increases in motivation and effort 
(Haslam, 2017). At the same time, in line with ideas presented on the group-serving bias, 
there is also likely to be a tendency for highly identified coaches to ‘protect’ their athletes 
and ‘explain away’ their poor performance. Here the tendency to focus on situational and not 
relevant dispositional attributions for poor performance may lead to a masking of the real 
causes of poor performance and divert attention away from relevant issues that need to be 
addressed. Understanding the complex dynamics that are at play here thus provides a rich 
and important agenda for future research.     
 
Conclusion  
Attribution processes are fundamental to success. For without attributions, athletes 
cannot understand why they have succeeded or failed and hence cannot learn from 
experiences in ways that allow them to avoid future failure. This is true in all spheres of life 
— not only in sport but also in education, politics, business, and social relationships. The 
goal of this chapter has been to map out the theoretical underpinnings of attribution 
processes. That said, our review of the models that have dominated this field to date (not only 
in sport but also in general social psychology) have predominantly focused on attributions 
about individuals made by people who are acting as individuals. The role of groups and 
group processes is thus noticeably absent from these models.  
Seeking to correct for this omission, the social identity approach to attributions that 
we set out in this chapter shows how attention to group-sourced and group-focused 
explanations can provide a fuller appreciation of the attribution process. It also provides 
greater insight into the nature of adaptive explanations for events and behaviours. More 
specifically, by elaborating three key points that can be derived from this approach, we 
underscored its relevance to four of the ‘5Ps’ identified in Chapter 2: participation, 
performance, psychological and physical health, and partisanship.  
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Yet whilst it was not explicitly discussed in this chapter, it is clear too that a social 
identity approach to attributions in sport and exercise contexts also speaks to the fifth P:  
politics. Not least this is because identity-based politics is a key determinant of the big-
picture issue of what we seek to explain in sport. So, amongst other things, it is social 
identity that determines whether we focus more on the causes of success in Australian Rules 
Football than in Snowboarding; or more on the causes of drug-taking in former East 
Germany or China than in Britain or the United States.                
Without a proper appreciation of attribution processes, then, our understanding of 
sport and exercise psychology is quite limited. Our hope is that this chapter, serves to refresh 
readers’ interest in this area and to stimulate a plethora of new research. For whilst we have 
explained the relevance of the social identity approach to the study of attributions in sport 
and exercise, clearly much more remains to be done to develop, test, and apply the ideas set 
out above. In closing, we therefore align ourselves — and hopefully readers — with the 
attributional discourse of Rory Best in noting that the success of this enterprise is going to 
require a lot of hard work and a massive team effort. 
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